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STUDENT COMMENTS
AN ANALYSIS OF THE UNIFORM CONSUMER CREDIT
CODE AND THE NATIONAL CONSUMER ACT
INTRODUCTION
Since the end of World War II, the total outstanding consumer
credit in the United States has increased from five billion dollars to
over one hundred and twenty billion dollars.' The staggering nature of
this figure reflects the important position credit has assumed for
Americans in the purchase of goods and services. 2 This transformation
of Atherica from a "cash and carry" to a "buy now, pay later" society
has produced a myriad of legal and social problems." Readily available
credit has tended to make the purchaser less discriminatory as to what
he will buy and the terms to which he will agree. 4 This has made the
consumer vulnerable to deceptive sales practices and unconscionable
credit agreements against which there have been few legislative safe-
guards. Indeed, until the last decade the traditional economic theories
of caveat emptor and laissez-faire governed the consumer transaction.'
Still another side effect of this credit wave that has swept the country
is financial overcommitment by the consumer leading to default, wage
garnishment and of ten bankruptcy.° The quantitative increase in con-
sumer dissatisfaction over this situation has brought into focus the
acuteness of the problem and has led to a movement for legislative
reform. Two such proposals for legislative consumer protection are the
Uniform Consumer Credit Code (U.C.C.C.) 7 and the National Con-
sumer Act (N.C.A.) . 8
This comment will analyze the provisions of the U.C.C.C. and the
N.C.A. with a tripartite purpose. First, the background of both Acts
will be traced in order to define their scope and purpose. Second, in
the areas common to each proposal, an article by article comparison
will be made, with particular emphasis given to those provisions per-
taining to consumer credit transactions, insurance, remedies and ad-
ministration. Third, there will be an exposition of the subjects dealt
with by the N.C.A. but not covered by the U.C.C.C. These areas con-
cern principally credit card restrictions, limitations on deceptive sales
practices, and regulation of debt collection and credit-reporting
1
 56 Fed. Res. Bull, A54 (Apr. 1970).
2 See B. Curran, Trends in Consumer Credit Legislation (1965).
8 See Boyd, Representing Consumers—The Uniform Commercial Code and Beyond,
9 Ariz. L. Rev. 372 (1968).
4
 Jordan & Warren, A Proposed Uniform Code for Consumer Credit, 8 B.C. Ind, &
Corn. L. Rev. 441, 448-49 (1967).
5 See J. Bishop, Jr. & H. Hubbard, Let the Seller Beware 4-5, 24, 65 (1969).
Jordan & Warren, supra note 4, at 448.
7 Uniform Consumer Credit Code (revised final draft 1969) [hereinafter cited as
U.C.C.C.1.
8
 National Consumer Act (first final draft 1969) [hereinafter cited as
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agencies. In examining each of these legislative proposals, assessments
will be made as to their merits and shortcomings, and recommendations
for improvement will be offered.
I. BACKGROUND
The U.C.C.C. had its genesis in 1957 when the Council of State
Governments requested that the National Conference on Uniform
State Laws° draft a model retail installment sales act. 1° The National
Conference agreed, but after four years and the preparation of several
drafts, it realized that a project of such limited scope would satisfy
no one." Within the credit industry there were differences of opinion
as to how far such an act should extend: some groups favored a broad
approach which would include such hybrid credit devices as the revolv-
ing charge account, while others did not." Consumer interests con-
sidered the project too narrow and felt that it should be broadened to
include all facets of consumer credit." As a result of this general dis-
satisfaction, the National Conference decided upon a more ambitious
undertaking." Accordingly, in 1963, the National Conference estab-
lished a Special Committee on Retail Installment Sales, Consumer
Credit, Small Loans and Usury, and charged it with the preparation of
a model act." After two years of work the first tentative draft of the
U.C.C.C. was submitted to the National Conference at its 1966 meet-
ing."
Following this initial effort, six additional working drafts were
produced. The discussions and criticisms that shaped these subsequent
drafts concerned both the format the code should adopt and the sub-
stantive provisions it should contain." An initial controversy focused
on the subject of credit sales and loans. Certain factions contended
that these two areas should be treated separately as has traditionally
9 The National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws is an organiza-
tion made up of representatives from each of the states, whose function is to draft model
legislation. Provision for the appointment of Commissioners is made by statute in each
state, with appointments customarily made by the governor. The organization, established
in 1892, has drafted the Uniform Negotiable Instruments Law, the Uniform Sales Act,
the Uniform Stock Transfer Act and the Uniform Commercial Code. Malcolm, The Uni-
form Consumer Credit Code, 25 Bus. Law. 937 (1970).
10 Richter, The Uniform Consumer Credit Code of the National Conference of Com-





15 Id. at 185. The Special Committee was composed of practicing attorneys, law
school professors, a state legislator and a jurist. This committee appointed an Advisory
Committee which represented consumer and creditor interests. Serving on the Advisory
Committee were representatives of the Association of Better Business Bureaus, Inc., the
National Legal Aid and Defenders Association, the AFL-CIO and the National Association
of Consumer Credit Administrators. Id. at 186.
10 Id.
17 See Richter, supra note 10.
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been the case in state law. Others expressed the opinion that the
distinction between credit sales and loans should be eliminated and
replaced by a single treatment of the consumer credit transaction. 18
Differences of opinion also arose concerning some fundamental eco-
nomic assumptions upon which the U.C.C.C. should be based. Some
critics advocated close government regulation, such as restricting the
entry of financing institutions into the credit field, as a means of
affording consumer protection. Others felt that free entry should be
allowed so as to provide an environment of vigorous competition
among creditors? A related topic of discussion pertained to the adop-
tion of rate ceilings. Those who favored freedom of entry felt that a
high rate ceiling would induce additional lenders to offer consumer
credit. They felt a broad selection of credit sources would encourage
consumers to "shop" for the best credit deal, thereby causing rates to
fluctuate accordingly.2° Critics, however, sought a closely regulated
pattern of rates to be administered by each state according to its
economic needs."
Two years of redrafting were necessary to resolve these questions.
Finally, in 1968, the Revised Tentative Final Draft received the
approval of the National Conference." The following provisions had
been incorporated into the Code: first, credit sales and loans were
treated in separate sections; second, the freedom of entry view was
adopted; and third, a high rate ceiling was chosen, but with elaborate
provisions for disclosure of credit rates to the consumer. The American
Bar Association (ABA) followed with its approval of the U.C.C.C.
in August, 1968. 23
Shortly, after the U.C.C.C. received the blessings of the National
Conference and the ABA, it became the subject of widespread con-
troversy." Its proponents felt that it embodied a balanced approach
to consumer credit legislation, and that the interests of both the credi-
I° Id. at 187. For a more elaborate discussion of the credit sale-loan debate see
pp. 894-96 infra.
10
 Id. at 189. See pp. 896-98 infra.
20 Id. at 189-90. See Warren, The Uniform Consumer Credit Code, 24 Bus. Law. 209
(1968). See also pp. 896-98 infra.
21 See Harper, The Uniform Consumer Credit Code and Freedom of Entry, 24 Bus.
Law. 227, 234-35 (1968).
22 U.C.C.C., Prefatory note.
23 Id.
24 Among those articles favorable to the U.C.C.C. are: Kripke, Gesture and Reality
in Consumer Credit Reform, 44 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1 (1969); Malcolm, The Uniform Con-
sumer Credit Code--Possible Legislation in Massachusetts, 54 Mass. L. Q. 34 (1969);
Moo, Consumerism and the UCCC, 25 Bus. Law. 957 (1970); Robertson, Consumer Pro-
tection Under the U.C.C.C., 41 Miss. L.J. 36 (1969); and Warren, The Uniform Con-
sumer Credit Code, 24 Bus. Law. 209 (1968). Among those unfavorable to the U.C.C.C.
are: James & Fragomen, The Uniform Consumer Credit Code; Inadequate Remedies
Under Articles V and VI, 57 Geo. L.J. 923 (1969); Harper, The Uniform Consumer Credit
Code, 44 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 53 (1969); and Willie; A Uniforni Consumer Creditor's Code,
54 Mass. L. Q. 53 (1969).
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for and consumer were improved." Opponents, however, expressed the
opinion that the final proposal failed to provide adequate consumer
protection." They maintained that the compromises which had been
made worked mostly to the detriment of the consumer." For instance,
serious doubt existed as to the validity of the economic arguments
advanced in support of the freedom of entry concept." An attorney
who served as an advisor to the Special Committee summarized this
concern by noting that
unbridled entry would promote overselling by some lenders,
especially by those without experience in the consumer lend-
ing field; many ill-informed or financially irrational borrowers
would succumb to the blandishments of easy credit and
become overcommitted; duplication of facilities and ineffi-
ciency would result; the increased competition would tend to
lead to wild credit practices to the detriment of all. . 2"
Criticism was also leveled at the preferential treatment accorded
creditors in the section dealing with remedies." Neither rescission
nor class actions were provided for, and attorney's fees could be col-
lected only in the event of disclosure violations."' As a result, many
of the substantive provisions, regulating creditor actions became little
more than excess verbiage!' Conversely, the consumer was still subject
to extensive penalties upon his default. Non-judicial repossession was
permitted, and wage garnishment, although limited, was still an avail-
able collection device."3 A more general criticism lodged against the
U.C.C.C. was that it failed to address itself to the unique problems of
the poor, the economic class that needed its protection most Indeed,
even some who favored the Code conceded that it provided primarily
for the middle-income consumer and left the condition of the poverty-
level debtor relatively unimproved.'" In short, it was believed that the
U.C.C.C. was simply "too little and too late."'" The state legislatures
25 Miskell, Commentary, 24 Bus. Law. 221 (1968).
26 Willier, supra note 24, at 53.
27 Id.
28 See Harper, The Uniform Consumer Credit Code and Freedom of Entry, 24 Bus.
Law. 227 (1968).
28 Id .
so See James & Fragomen, supra note 24, at 954.
31 W. Boyd, National Consumer Act and the Uniform Commercial Code—A Com-
parison and Critique, at 14 (unpublished manuscript on file at the National Consumer
Law Center).
82 James & Fragomen, supra note 24, at 929-30.
83 Id. at 930 et seq.
84 McLean, The Federal Consumer Credit Protection Act, 24 Bus. Law. 199, 206-07
(1968).
36 Id.
so See Wilier, supra note 24, at 61.
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apparently agreed because to date the U.C.C.C. has been introduced
in forty-seven state legislatures, but has been enacted in only two."
Dissatisfaction with the U.C.C.C. was generally reaffirmed at a
conference on consumer protection co-sponsored by the National Legal
Aid and Defenders Association and the National Consumer Law Cen-
ter's in June, 1969. The consensus obtained was that the Act was
inadequate and needed substantial revision," especially in regard to
the scope of consumer protection and the availability of private rem-
edies. The National Consumer Law Center was asked to undertake
the drafting of a model act which would fill the gaps left by the
U.C.C.C.4° The Center, with the aid of several experts in the field of
consumer law,'" responded by drafting the N.C.A., the first draft of
which was released to the public in February, 1970.42
The approach taken by the N.C.A. is clearly consumer-oriented.
It attempts to offset the creditor's superior bargaining position and
legal sophistication by strict regulation of advertising and selling, and
by limitation of the remedies available upon consumer default. Re-
possession and collection of debts can only be accomplished by judicial
process, and the defaulting debtor is given a reasonable chance to cure
his default and redeem repossessed collateral. Also, the remedies avail-
able to the consumer upon the seller's breach are clearly defined.
Rescission is a weapon made'available to the consumer, as are punitive
damages and attorney's fees. Finally, the N.C.A. deals with areas
ignored by the U.C.C.C. Modern consumer problems of credit cards,
credit-reporting agencies and deceptive sales techniques are covered at
length in the N.C.A.
87 See Okla. Stat. Ann. tit 14A, 4 1-101 et seq. (1969), and Utah Code Ann. tit 70B,
§ 1-101 et seq. (1969).
38 The National Consumer Law Center was established at Boston College Law School
in June of 1969 under the auspices of the Office of Economic Opportunity (OEO). The
Center is designed to aid the poor in the United States through study and reform of legal
doctrines which work to their detriment. The Center also assists over 2000 legal services
attorneys across the country with consumer law problems.
39 N.C.A., Prefatory note.
40 Id.
41 The Center, under the direction of Professor William F. Willier, relied heavily
upon a special committee of experts, including Erma Angevine, Executive Director, Con-
sumer Federation of America; Berlin, Roisman and Kessler, a Washington law firm serv-
ing as counsel to the Consumer Federation of America and to the AFL-UAW; The
Honorable George Brunn, Judge, Municipal Court, Berkeley-Albany Judicial District,
California; Ann Draper, Economist, AFL-CIO; Richard A. Elbrecht, Director, Legal
Services for Santa Clara, California; Maribeth Halloran, Staff Attorney, Legal Services
Office for the District of Columbia; Robert J. Klein, Consumers Union; and Philip
Schrag, Counsel, NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund, Inc., and Special Advisor
on Consumer Affairs to Mayor Lindsay. N.CA., Prefatory note.
42 Id. The second edition of the First Final Draft was distributed shortly after this
article went to press.
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IL COMMON AREAS OF THE U.C.C.C. AND N.C.A.
A. The Consumer Credit Transaction
The most pervasive subject covered by the U.C.C.C. and N.C.A.
is that of the consumer credit transaction. Generally, for both Acts a
consumer credit transaction is any transaction where the buyer or
debtor is not an organization, and is dealing with a merchant or other
person regularly engaged in business. This transaction must be made
for some personal, household or farm purpose, and the obligation is
payable in installments in which the amount financed does not exceed
twenty-five thousand dollars." Articles 2 and 3 of the U.C.C.C.
deal respectively with consumer credit sales and consumer loans." The
43 	§ 2.104 states:
(1) Except as provided in subsection (2), "consumer credit sale" is a sale of
goods, services, or an interest in land in which
(a) credit is granted by a person who regularly engages as a seller in credit
transactions of the same kind,
(b) the buyer is a person other than an organization,
(c) the goods, services, or interest in land are purchased primarily for a
personal, family, household or agricultural purpose.
(d) either the debt is payable in installments or a credit service charge is
made and
(e) with respect to a sale of goods or services, the amount financed does
not exceed $25,000.
§ 3.104 states;
(1) Except with respect to a loan primarily secured by an interest in land
(Section 3.105), "consumer loan" is a loan made by a person regularly engaged
in the business of making loans in which
(a) the debtor is a person other than an organization;
(b) the debt is incurred primarily for a personal, family, household or agri-
cultural purpose;
(c) either the debt is payable in installments or a Ioan finance charge is
made;
(d) either the principal does not exceed $25,000 or the debt is secured by an
interest in land.
N.C.A. § 1.301(10) provides:
"Consumer credit transaction" means a consumer transaction between a merchant
and a consumer in which real or personal property, services or money is acquired
on credit and the consumer's obligation is payable in installments or for which
credit a finance charge is or may be imposed, whether such transaction is pur-
suant to an open end credit plan or is a transaction involving other than open
end credit. The term includes consumer credit sales, consumer loans, consumer
leases and transactions pursuant to a seller or lender credit card.
N.C.A. § 1.202 provides:
EXCLUSIONS
This Act does not apply to
(1) extensions of credit to government or governmental agencies or instrumen-
talities; or
(2) extensions of credit to organizations; or
(3) transactions in which all parties are organizations; or
(4) consumer credit transactions in which the amount financed exceeds . $25,000
or other consumer transactions in which the cash price exceeds $25,000.
44 U.C.C.C. 14 2.101-605, 3.101-605.
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N.C.A., however, abandons the credit sale-loan distinction in favor of
a general article covering the "Consumer Credit Transaction.""
The credit sale-loan distinction evolved when the courts gave
approval to the merchants' practice of selling an item at two different
prices—one price for cash customers and another for credit cus-
tomers." This so-called "time-price differential" was held by the courts
to be part of the product price and not an interest charge. 47 Con-
sequently, a credit sale could have a much higher effective rate of
interest than a loan, and the merchants could evade usury restric-
tions." The rationale supporting this judge-made distinction was that
a basic difference existed between a borrower seeking a loan and a
purchaser participating in a credit sale. The borrower, it was argued,
had a dire economic need and, therefore, was susceptible to rapacious
lenders. The purchaser, on the other hand, could always refuse to buy
an overpriced item, generally without incurring injury. 40 The underly-
ing premise was that loans were taken only when absolutely necessary
whereas the purchase of consumer goods was a non-essential under-
taking.
While this distinction might have been tenable at the time it was
formulated, it is of doubtful validity in the light of present economic
realities." Credit has become a normal incident to consumer buying,
and the small loan is used as readily as the retail installment agreement
as a means of financing purchases. Therefore, it no longer seems justi-
fiable to extend statutory protection to the loan and deny it to the
credit sale.
The U.C.C.C. adopts this view and eliminates the time-price dif-
ferential by providing substantively similar rules for both credit sales
and loans. The elements comprising the base price or principal upon
which a loan is based are the same, and the interest charge is regulated
in essentially the same manner." The retention of the credit sale-loan
dichotomy is a concession to critics who felt that the distinction was so
45 N.C.A. § 2.101-605.
46 Littlefield, Parties and Transactions Covered by Consumer Credit Legislation, 8
B.C. Ind. & Corn. L. Rev. 463, 464 (1967).
47 In
 Hogg v. Ruffner, 66 U.S. (1 Black) 115 (1861), the Court offered the follow-
ing justification:
But it is manifest that if A propose to sell to B a tract of land for $10,000 in
cash, or for $20,000 payable in ten annual installments, and if 13 prefers to pay
the larger sum to gain time, the contract cannot be called usurious. A vendor
may prefer $100 in hand to double the sum in expectency
Id. at 118-19. See, e.g., Newkirk v. Universal C.I.T. Credit Corp., 93 Ga. App. 1, 90
S.E.2d 618 (1955); Henry v. P. & E. Fin. Co., 197 Okla. 676, 174 P.2d 373 (1946).
45 Littlefield, supra note 46, at 464.
40 General Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Weinrich, 218 Mo. App. 68, 77-78, 262 S.W.
455, 458 (1924). For a discussion of usury laws and consumer credit see Limiting Con-
sumer Credit Charges by Reinterpretation of General Usuary Laws and by Separate
Regulation, 44 Nw. L. Rev. 303 (1960).
50 See Littlefield, supra note 46, at 465.
61 See note 59 infra.
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deeply rooted in state law that any alteration would necessarily lead
to confusion and complication."
The N.C.A. on the other hand, abandons the credit sale-loan
distinction in favor of an across-the-board treatment of the consumer
credit transaction." The position of the draftsmen of the N.C.A. is
that if the time-price differential is to be eliminated, the credit sale-
loan dichotomy becomes meaningless." To retain it, they contend, only
involves unnecessary duplication, while the single treatment of the
consumer credit transaction leads to a clearer and more distinct under-
standing of the entire Act." It is submitted that the elimination of the
time-price differential, and the regulation of credit sales as well as
loans, represents a significant improvement in consumer protection.
However, it seems that the U.C.C.C.'s separation of sections on sales
and loans is an unnecessary formal retention of the outmoded distinc-
tion. The N.C.A.'s single treatment provides a more convenient and
easily understandable format.
Two other instances where the U.C.C.C. and N.C.A. have reached
opposite solutions on similar issues concern entry into the credit field
and regulation of interest rates. The draftsmen of the U.C.C.C., as was
previously stated, opted for freedom of entry coupled with a high rate
ceiling." Their position was this: if restrictions upon entry are minimal
and rates on credit are allowed a high ceiling, credit institutions would
vie for consumer business and, consequently, these competitive condi-
tions would assure reasonable rates. In embracing this viewpoint, the
draftsmen of the U.C.C.C. felt that a broad base of competition would
both prevent monopoly in the consumer credit industry and assure
an adequate supply of credit." Indeed, it was argued that too low a
rate ceiling, and too many restrictions, might discourage reputable
lenders from undertaking the risks incident to consumer transactions,
and instead drive the prospective debtor to the "loan shark" or other
illegal creditor."
The mechanics of the U.C.C.C. regulation are fairly simple. A
lender may utilize either a rate structure ranging from 15 percent to
36 percent on the unpaid balance or, in the alternative, a fiat rate of
18 percent." For example, a creditor choosing the unpaid balance
52 U.C.C.C., Prefatory note; see also Richter, supra note 10, at 189.
55 N.C.A. Article 2.
54 N.C.A. 1.301(10), Comment.
55 Id.
58 U.C.C.C., Prefatory note. See p. 891 supra.
57 Id.
58 'Id.
, 55 Under U.C.C.C. § 2.201 the maximum rate on a credit sale is 36% per year on
that part of the unpaid balance which is $300 or less, 21% on the unpaid balance of the
amount financed which is more than $300 but does not exceed $1000, and 15% on that
part of the unpaid balance which is more than $1000. An alternative flat rate of 18%
per year may be charged. Under charge accounts, ceiling rates would be 2% per month
on the balance up to $500, and 11/2% per month on the remainder, with a minimum of
$.50 per month. On loans under U.C.C.C. 3.201 the maximum rate would be 18%,
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method of computing interest on a sale or loan obligation of $1,500
could charge 36 percent per year on the first $300, 21 percent on the
next $700, and 15 percent on the remaining $500. If this obligation
were for one year, the overall rate of interest would be 22 percent. If,
however, the amount of the loan were increased to $11,000, the unpaid
balance method would yield only 15.9 percent. If the flat rate alterna-
tive were chosen, in both situations the maximum yearly rate that
could be charged would be 18 percent. It is clear, then, that in the case
of the smaller obligation, the unpaid balance option would permit a
higher maximum interest rate.
The draftsmen of the N.C.A. reject in toto the economic reasoning
behind these U.C.C.C. provisions. They maintain that unbridled entry
will promote overselling by inexperienced lenders and, as a result of
the easy credit, overextension by borrowers." It is also contended that
experience has proven the economic concept of laissez-faire inapplica
ble to the creditor-debtor relationship,ai as credit practices are un-
affected by free competition, and in practice the high rate ceilings
which the U.C.C.C. postulates will in fact become the floors."
The N.C.A. chooses to regulate entry by requiring a showing of
"convenience and advantage" to a given locality by prospective credi-
tors, and eschews any attempt at structuring rates." Instead, the mat-
ter of maximum percentage amounts is left to the states' discretion.
It is argued that while a definite structure of rates might produce a
convenient uniformity among the states, consumer economic environ-
ments vary with local conditions, and a true consumer statute must be
concerned with regional and state needs." Hence, under the N.C.A. a
metropolitan state such as New York may choose its own rate pattern
and ceilings, and will not have to adhere to the same pattern adopted
by a midwestern agricultural state such as Kansas. This regulation of
rates, together with limitations upon entry, will allow the states
through administrative boards to balance carefully the interests of the
creditor and consumer, and maintain a close watch on creditors to
prevent overreaching.
The position of the N.C.A. is far more realistic than that of the
U.C.C.C. The U.C.C.C.'s theory of self-regulating rates due to con-
sumer rate shopping fails to take into account practical experience.
More often than not a prospective buyer will think only of the new
except for supervised lenders (those licensed under the U.C.C.C. or qualified to make
loans and receive deposits under federal or state law, U.C.C.C. 11 1.301(16), 3.501), who
could charge 36% on the unpaid balance to $300, 21% on the balance between $300 and
$1000, and 15% above $1000. U.C.C.C. 3.508.
60 See Harper, supra note 28, at 227.
61 See Wilier, supra note 24, at 54.
62 Id. at 56.
63 N.C.A. § 2.201 suggests an alternative pattern of rates which may be adopted by
the states. These are (a) a flat rate ceiling, (b) a graduated set of ceilings based on the
amount financed, (c) graduated or fiat rates as provided in the U.C.C.C.
64 N.C.A. { 1.102, Comment.
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car or stereo he is about to purchase and will fail to reflect upon
whether or not he can obtain more beneficial credit terms from another
dealer. This is especially true of the low-income buyer. As one com-
mentator noted:
An indigent client will too often sign anything, including a
document with the legend "I hereby agree to give up my right
arm if I don't pay"—in sixteen point and red and gold type."
There is a need to protect the unsophisticated buyer, and the N.C.A.'s
entry and rate sections fulfill this need by careful government regula-
tion.
Proceeding from the issues of market entry and rates, the N.C.A.
and U.C.C.C. next confront creditor practices designed to evade regu-
latory legislation, or provide an unfair advantage over the consumer.
Once again the N.C.A., reacting to what it considered omissions and
inadequacies under the U.C.C.C., responded with unmistakably con-
sumer-oriented provisions.
A device frequently used by creditors in an attempt to evade
maximum rate statutes is the inclusion of additional charges in the
price of an item rather than in the finance charge. The U.C.C.C. and
N.C.A. treat this problem in a similar fashion. Generally, both Acts
define the finance charge as including all charges which the consumer
must pay because it is a credit rather than a cash transaction. 68
 There-
fore, the basic price of an item would be constant regardless of the
status of the sale. However, as a concession to creditors, both the
U.C.C.C. and the N.C.A. exclude certain items from the finance charge.
Official fees, taxes, and certain insurance and real estate charges fall
under this exception." The U.C.C.C., however, makes an additional
66 James & Fragomen, supra note 24, at 954.
66 N.C.A. § 1.301(17); U.C.C.C. §§ 2.109, 3.109. Inflating the base price of a product
with items that are more properly finance charges is just one of several deceptive prac-
tices that frustrate the consumer in his attempt to use credit knowledgeably. Indeed, such
practices became so flagrant in the decade of the sixties that Congress enacted a compre-
hensive statute known as the Consumer Credit Protection Act (C.C.P.A.), 15 U.S.C.
¢§ 1601-677 (Supp. IV, 1968), the first chapter of which (Truth in Lending Act) dealt
specifically with disclosure. The C.C.PA. was enacted some two months before the final
promulgation of the U.C.C.C. and consequently raised the spectre of federal preemption
of disclosure regulations. Section 1633 of the Act provides, however, that a state enacting
"substantially similar" requirements may apply for exemption from the federal law, and
utilize its own legislation instead. This procedure is advocated by the U.C.C.C. as the pre-
ferable solution to the preemption problem. The N.C.A. takes a different approach and
incorporates the C.C.P.A. within its provisions by specific reference. N.CA. 2.306. By
this method, the draftsmen believed they could not only avoid conflicts stemming from
preemption, but also benefit the consumer by providing a choice of federal or state
forums In which to seek redress for violations. It is beyond the scope of this comment to
compare the C.C.PA. with the U.C.C.C. and N.CA. There are some differences, but in-
variably they take the form of more stringent requirements on the part of the U.C.C.C.
and the N.CA. For an interesting and informative treatment of the C.C.P.A. see Boyd,
The Federal Consumer Credit Protection Act--A Consumer Perspective, 45 Notre Dame
Law. 171 (1970).
6T N.CA. § 2.202; U.C.C.C. § 2.202.
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exclusion from the finance charge of "other benefits to the buyer or
debtor."°8 The N.C.A. omits this phrase because it is considered too
vague and could be used as a loophole to obviate the benefits which the
provisions concerning finance charges were meant to secure.
Another technique employed by creditors to deceive would-be
buyers is the expression of interest rates in monthly or quarterly
percentages. For instance, the interest rate is advertised at 13/2 per-
cent per month instead of 18 percent per annum. Debtors often fail to
make the mental computation of the annual rate and, consequently,
take on obligations greater than they can afford. The poorly educated,
low-income consumer is especially susceptible to this practice and,
therefore, is likely to sign an agreement without realizing its full
import. The U.C.C.C. and N.C.A. attempt to remedy this situation by
providing for comprehensible disclosure of the finance charge to the
consumer.
Both the U.C.C.C. and the N.C.A. require that disclosure be made
clearly and conspicuously and in writing." These legislative proposals
also provide that in regard to a precomputable credit sale or loan,
the creditor must disclose to the debtor the amount financed expressed
as a dollar amount, the finance charge expressed as a dollar amount,
and as an annual percentage rate, the number of payments to be made,
the due date of the first payment, and the interval between any sub-
sequent payments." Under the U.C.C.C., however, the requirement
for expressing the finance charge as an annual percentage rate is
dropped if the amount of the service charge is less than $5 when the
amount financed is less than $75, or less than $7.50 when the amount
financed exceeds $75. 71 The N.C.A. does not contain such a minimum
rate exception."
The N.C.A. also provides that every consumer credit transaction
must be evidenced by a single writing signed by both parties." This
writing must be set in eight-point type, and must contain a notice to
the consumer in twelve-point boldface type that he should not sign
the agreement if there are contained in it any blank spaces, that he
is entitled to a copy of the agreement, and that he has a right to pre-pay
and receive a partial refund of the service charge. 74
 The reason for
these provisions is to prevent confusion of the debtor through the use
of multiple writings and small print."
It is submitted that the disclosure provisions in these proposed
Acts are admirable advances in consumer protection. However, they
38 U.C.C.C. §§ 2.202(c), 3.202(c).
60 N.C.A. § 2.301(1) (a) (b) ; U.C.C.C. 2.302 (a) (b).
70 N.C.A. § 2.306 incorporated the C.CP.A. by specific reference. See 15 U.S.C.
1638 (Supp. IV, 1968); U.C.C.C. §§ 2.306, 3.306.
71 U.C.C.C.	 2,306(2)(k), 3,306(h).
72 N.C.A. § 2.307.
73 N.C.A. 1 2.302(1).
74 N.C.A. § 2.302(3).
75 N.C.A. § 2.302, Comment.
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apply principally to the prudent credit purchaser who will understand
and act wisely upon disclosed information. This group of debtors in-
cludes primarily the middle and upper class. The position of the
poverty-level debtor is unlikely to be changed as a result of elaborate
disclosure. This type of consumer does not usually discriminate be-
tween rates, and is less likely to act rationally upon disclosed informa-
tion.
Still another method widely employed by unscrupulous creditors
to avoid existing consumer safeguards is the insertion of clauses into
sales and loan agreements which give the creditor an unfair advantage.
This practice is usually defended on the ground that the buyer deals
with the merchant on a voluntary basis and is free to accept or reject
the terms of the sale. While it is conceded that this argument may have
had validity when the buyer and seller stood on equal ground, it
becomes untenable when viewed in the light of present bargaining
positions. The consumer often assumes an inferior place to the large-
scale seller or lender who is sophisticated in the legal implications of
such bargainings. Consequently, both the N.C.A. and the U.C.C.C.
forbid certain practices which allow creditors to obtain an unfair
advantage over the consumer. For instance, the use of multiple agree-
ments, either for the purpose of obtaining a higher credit charge than
would otherwise be allowed or evading disclosure requirements, is
prohibited. 7° Similarly, both legislative proposals ban the assignment
of the consumer's earnings to the creditor" and the use of confession
of judgment agreements, 78
 two methods used to deprive the buyer of
judicial process in the realm of debt collection.
Another creditors' device limited by the U.C.C.C. and the N.C.A.
is the use of "balloon payments." This is a practice which limits the
first few installments of a time-payment agreement to a minimal
amount. The bulk of the obligation becomes due later in considerably
larger payments. Consumers find the arrangement attractive because
they can easily meet the initial payments, and feel that somehow they
will be able to take care of the later payments. Too often, however,
when the larger installments become due, the debtor lacks the funds
to meet them and is forced to default. Under the U.C.C.C., subsequent
payments are limited to no more than twice the average of earlier pay-
ments.7° Therefore, if the first six payments are for $10, and the next
six are for $12, the thirteenth may not exceed $22. The N.C.A. is more
restrictive and forbids installments which are not "substantially equal"
in time interval and amount to the average earlier payments°
The use of negotiable instruments as indicia of indebtedness is
yet another technique utilized by creditors to enhance their position
79 N.C.A. § 2A13; U.C.C.C. H 2.402, 3.409.
TT N.CA. § 2.403; U.C.C.C. §§ 2.410, 3.403.
78 N.C.A. § 2.404; U.C.C.C. 	 2.415, 3.407.
79 U.C.C.C. I§ 2.405, 3.402.
99 N.CA. { 2.402.
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at the expense of the consumer. Under the Uniform Commercial Code
a person who in good faith acquires a negotiable instrument for value
and without notice of claims to it or defenses against it becomes a
"holder in due course,"" and takes the instrument free of any personal
defenses the maker may have had against the seller. 82 This limitation
has allowed merchants to discount instruments taken in consumer
transactions to financial institutions and thereby avoid the possibility
of non-payment motivated by breach of warranty or other omissions
on their part.' This often leaves the merchant with the money, the
bank with "an enforceable obligation," and the buyer with faulty
merchandise. In response to this situation, both the U.C.C.C. and
N.C.A. contain sections limiting the use of negotiable instruments in
consumer credit transactions." The U.C.C.C. states that
Mt) a consumer credit sale or consumer lease, other than a
sale or lease for an agricultural purpose, the seller or lessor
may not take a negotiable instrument other than a check as
evidence of the obligation of the buyer or lessee. A holder is
not in good faith if he takes a negotiable instrument with
notice that it is issued in violation of this section." (Empha-
sis added.)
The purpose of this provision is to make it difficult for a disreputable
merchant to negotiate an instrument taken in conjunction with a con-
sumer sale. In effect, any negotiable instrument related to a consumer
credit sale is in violation of the section. Established financing com-
panies, once aware that they no longer have the immunity associated
with holder in due course status, will cease doing business with mer-
chants who fail to fulfill their obligations to customers. But there
remains the possibility of a negotiable instrument derived from a con-
sumer transaction coming into the hands of a holder without notice of
its origins, and, therefore, making him a holder in due course and free
from the personal defenses of the maker." However, the drafters
considered such a possibility sufficiently remote so as to preclude a
more complete retraction of the policy which favors negotiability."
Still another loophole in this approach, through which unwary
buyers may be victimized, is its restriction to credit sales." The
U.C.C.C. treats consumer loans separately, and thus permits a mer-
chant to make an arrangement in which potential credit customers are
81 U.C.C. I 3-302.
52 U.C.C. 1 3-305.
83 See generally Judicial and Statutory Limitations of a "Holder in Due Course" in
Consumer Transactions, 11 B.C. Ind. & Com. L, Rev. 90 (1969).
84 N.C.A. 2.405; U.C.C.C. § 2.403.
85 U.C.C.C. 1 2.403.
86 See Littlefield, Preserving Consumer Defenses; Plugging the Loophole in the New
U.C.C.C., 44 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 272 (1969).
87 U.C.C.C. 1 2.403, Comment.
88 Littlefield, supra note 86, at 292.
901
BOSTON COLLEGE INDUSTRIAL AND COMMERCIAL LAW REVIEW
referred to a finance company for the purpose of obtaining such a
loan. The finance company, as the independent third party, enjoys the
same immunity from personal defenses accorded to a holder in due
course. Once again the merchant has the money, the creditor immunity,
and the consumer the bag.
The N.C.A. plugged these loopholes by providing that: (1) no
negotiable instrument may be used in a consumer credit transaction;
(2) any subsequent holder is subject to whatever defenses the con-
sumer has against the seller; B0. and (3) a creditor who makes a con-
sumer loan and is "connected with" or "participated in" the credit
sale or lease for which the loan was obtained is susceptible to any
defenses the consumer might have against the seller." This section
prohibits the dealer from accomplishing indirectly what it could not
do directly. Hence, a bank or finance agency which regularly does
business with a dealer cannot escape liability for defenses which could
be used against the dealer when a consumer loan has been taken for
a transaction with the dealer.
It is submitted that in regard to limitations on the use of balloon
payments and negotiable instruments, the N.C.A. represents a con-
siderable improvement over the U.C.C.C. The writers of the U.C.C.C.
drafted inadequate sections containing loopholes through which credi-
tors could circumvent the protections these provisions were meant to
afford the debtor. The N.C.A., through careful use of language and
stricter limitations, accomplished the purpose which the U.C.C.C. un-
successfully sought to attain.
Another major limitation imposed on credit transactions pertains
to the use of security agreements. These are interests in goods or land
which are taken in conjunction with a consumer credit sale or loan.
In the event that the debtor fails to fulfill his obligation, the creditor
can enforce these interests by repossessing and disposing of the col-
lateral. Although secured transactions are covered by Article 9 of
the Uniform Commercial Code, the note on the scope and policy of
Article 9 clearly indicates that it is not intended to usurp the areas
of small loans and consumer credit purchases. 91 Accordingly, the
U.C.C.C. and the N.C.A. found it necessary to include sections on
secured interests taken in conjunction with the consumer credit sale or
loan.
Generally, in a consumer credit sale the U.C.C.C. permits a seller
89 N.C.A. n 2.405, 2.406.
9° N.C.A.	 2.407.
91 U.C.C. zi 9-102, Note states:
This article primarily sets out rules defining the rights of a secured party against
persons dealing with the debtor; it does not prescribe regulations and controls
which may be necessary to curb abuses arising in the small Ioan business or in
the financing of consumer purchases on credit. Accordingly, there is no repeal of
existing regulatory acts in those fields....
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to retain a purchase money security interest" in goods sold. In addi-
tion:
[he] may take a security interest in goods upon which ser-
vices are performed or in which goods sold are installed or to
which they are annexed, or in land to which the goods are
affixed or which is maintained, repaired or improved as a re-
sult of the sale of the goods or services, if in the case of a
security interest in the land the debt secured is $1000 or
more, or in the case of a security interest in goods the debt
secured is $300 or more. The seller may also take a security
interest in any property of the buyer to secure the debt
arising from a consumer credit sale primarily for an agricul-
tural purpose . . . ."
The U.C.C.C. also provides a triggering mechanism for adjusting the
dollar amounts specified above to reflect changes in the Consumer
Price Index. The adjustment would take place on even numbered years
in the event of a ten percent or greater fluctuation." Security agree-
ments obtained in contravention of those provisions are void."
The N.C.A., like the U.C.C.C., permits a security interest in the
goods sold." However, when dealing with goods upon which services
have been performed, or land upon which improvements have been
made, the required debt obligation has been raised to $500 or more for
a security interest in goods and $3000 or more for a security interest in
land." The N.C.A. further provides that no security interest, other
than the purchase money security interest, may be taken with respect
to household furnishings, appliances and clothing of the consumer or
his dependents." This provision protects the consumer's personal and
family necessities from being used as collateral for a transaction
which covers the purchase of goods other than these household items.
The higher dollar amounts required by the N.C.A. in order to
justify retention of a security interest in goods reflect the predilection
of its draftsmen toward consumer interests. Surprisingly, however,
there is no self-triggering device for adjusting these amounts to reflect
inflation. Apparently, however, the Administrator of the N.C.A. may
make adjustments according to a state's particular needs." It is sub-
mitted that the U.C.C.C.'s automatic adjustment is preferable to the
discretionary approach of the N.C.A.
92 The U.C.C. defines a "purchase money security interest" as one a seller may retain
in the goods actually sold, or one a lender may acquire in goods purchased by the loan.
95 U.C.C.C. 1 2.407(1).
94 U.C.C.C.	 1.106.
95 U.C.C.C.	 2.407(3).
9° N.CA. I 2.416(1).
N.CA. § 3.416(5).
os N . CA. § 2.416(2).
99
 N.CA. 4 6.104(1)(g).
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In regard to a consumer loan, the security interest which may be
taken on goods is unlimited under the U.C.C.C. A security interest in
land pursuant to a consumer loan may be taken if the loan exceeds
$1000, or if the loan is less than $1000 and the rate charged is 18 per-
cent or less."' The N.C.A. provides that a consumer loan may only be
secured by an interest in goods up to one and one-half times the amount
of the principal, and in land if the obligation incurred is $3000 or
more.'"
In the case of security interests, the retention of the credit sale-
loan distinction by the U.C.C.C. makes a practical difference.'" In
regard to a credit sale, the seller is limited to taking a security interest
in goods only if the obligation is $300 or more, and in land if the ob-
ligation is $1000 or more. On a loan, the lender can be secured by an
unlimited interest in goods, and, if the transaction has an 18 percent
or less rate, or is over $1000, by an unlimited interest in land. Hence,
as one critic has pointed out, under the U.C.C.C. a seller of a used car
for $600 in a credit transaction could not take an interest in the
buyer's land, whereas a finance company making an 18 percent loan
which was used to buy a $600 automobile could.'"
A novel area of limitation on credit sales which is included in both
the U.C.C.C. and the N.C.A. pertains to home solicitation sales, or
what the N.C.A. calls "consumer approval transactions." The home
solicitation sale sections of the U.C.C.C.'" were drafted in response to
consumer complaints about the high pressure tactics of door-to-door
salesmen.'" The U.C.C.C. provides for a "cooling-off" period during
which the buyer of goods sold on credit by personal solicitation at the
consumer's residence has the right to cancel the sale.'" The buyer in
such a transaction may cancel the sale by written notice to the seller
within three days after the sale.'" Upon cancellation the buyer's only
obligation is the lesser of either a cancellation fee of five percent of
the purchase price or forfeiture of the down payment.'"
The N.C.A., on the other hand, speaks of "outside" and "inside"
consumer approval transactions."' "An 'outside consumer approval
100 U.C.C.C. § 3.510. For instance, the U.C.C.C. would allow a creditor extending a
$100 loan to acquire a security interest in all of the debtors household goods, his car, and
whatever other personal property he might have.
101 N.C.A. § 2.416(3). Under the N.C.A. the creditor extending the $100 consumer
loan would, in effect, be required to appraise the consumer's personal property and restrict
his security interests to goods having a total fair market value of $150 or less.
102 See pp. 894-96 supra.
108 See W. Boyd, National Consumer Act and the Uniform Consumer Credit Code:
A Comparison and Critique (unpublished manuscript available at the National Consumer
Law Center).
104 U.C.C.C. §§ 2.501-505.
108 U.C.C.C. § 2.501, Comment 1. See generally Littlefield, The Home Solicitation
Act of 1967, 42 Conn. B.J. 426 (1968).
106 U.C.C.C. § 2.502.
1°7 Id.
1°8 U.C.C.C. 2.504.
109 N.C.A. §4 2.501-505.
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transaction' means a consumer transaction which is initiated or con-
summated personally by a merchant at a place other than this
merchant's place of business.""° The outside consumer approval
transaction is not a binding contract unless the consumer affirms in
writing within a three-day period after he has been notified of the man-
ner of affirmation. During this three-day period the seller may not
change the terms of the transaction."' If there is no affirmation, there
arises no contractual obligation on the part of either party. 112
The proposition that a transaction is void until subsequently re-
affirmed marks a radical departure from existing law regarding the
ability to contract in a face-to-face manner. The dealings with the
merchant in the "outside transaction" would have to be construed as
an offer to contract which is irrevocable for the three-day period fol-
lowing solicitation. The role of the' door-to-door salesman will be
altered in that he will lose the ability to consummate agreements, and
instead become one who presents or offers goods. The consumer, then,
takes the subsequent and conclusive part by affirming. In effect, the
freedom to contract spontaneously is severely limited outside the
merchant's place of business.
The N.C.A. further states that in an "inside consumer approval
transaction," that is, a transaction which is initiated in the merchant's
place of business and in which the dollar amount exceeds $50, 1 " the
consumer has three days in which he can cancel without obligation.'"
This stipulation by the N.C.A. in the "inside transaction" resembles
that of the U.C.C.C. with regard to home solicitation sales.
Again, to adopt these provisions would involve a substantial re-
vision of contract concepts.'" These provisions of the U.C.C.C. and
N.C.A. would also encounter much opposition by businessmen con-
cerned with the loss of business due to such restrictions." 0 The busi-
nesses which depend upon the door-to-door sale of a large volume of
small items such as cosmetics might suffer substantially under these
limitations. It is submitted that the U.C.C.C.'s treatment of home
solicitation sales represents a more realistic and balanced view of
merchant and consumer rights than that of the N.C.A. With regard to
the N.C.A.'s section on inside consumer approval transactions, it is
suggested that the dollar amount be raised to $100 to make it more
acceptable to creditor interests.
B. Insurance
The subject of insurance, although an independent area of law in
itself, becomes related to the consumer transaction as a legitimate
110 N.C.A. § 2.501(2).
111 N.C.A. 2.502(2).
112 N.C.A. § 2.502(1).
118 N.C.A. § 2.501(1).
114 N.C.A. § 2.505.
116 See W. Boyd, supra note 103.
118 Id.
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and convenient means of guaranteeing payment to the creditor in the
event of unforeseen circumstances such as the debtor's death or de-
struction of the collateral. Like other consumer-creditor transactions,
the insurance requirements have been handled in ways that work to
the disadvantage of the purchaser. Unfair rates due to collusion and
kickbacks between insurance companies and dealers have been det-
rimental to the consumer. Articles 4 of both the N.C.A. and U.C.C.C.
deal with insurance. The U.C.C.C. allows the creditor to charge
separately for accident, health and life insurance and certain prop-
erty insurance which he provides or requires in connection with a
consumer credit transaction.'" The U.C.C.C., however, requires that
certain disclosure requirements must be adhered to in regard to in-
surance. The creditor must inform the consumer of the cost of the
insurance, as well as the consumer's option to procure insurance from
an outside source." 8 The N.C.A. provides that accident, health and
life insurance coverage may be charged separately only if they are
taken by the consumer on a voluntary basis. 11° If the creditor requires
insurance, this cost must be computed in the finance charge." 0 Hence,
under the U.C.C.C. the creditor can require insurance and charge the
consumer for it apart from the finance charge, while under the N.C.A.,
if insurance is mandatory, the amount of the premiums must be con-
sidered as part of the finance charge which itself is subject to maxi-
mum rate restrictions.
Both the N.C.A. and the U.C.C.C. delegate the regulation of per-
missable rates to the Commissioners of Insurance in the individual
states."' The N.C.A. does provide, however, rather specific guidelines
for the Commissioners to follow. 122
The N.C.A. also provides that a creditor supplying insurance
shall not receive any fee or commission either directly or indirectly as
a result of his procurement of such insurance. 128 Thus, a "kickback"
from an insurance company with whom the creditor deals would be
prohibited.
C. Remedies and Penalties
Although the availability of effective means of redress is essential
to the protection of the creditor and the assurance of the debtor's per-
formance, the question has been raised as to whether or not the
multiplicity of remedies available to the creditor might not produce
unjust and undesirable results in many cases.'" Both the U.C.C.C. and
117 U.C.C.C.	 2.202, 3.202, 4.104, 4.301.
11 R U.C.C.C. 1 2.202(a).
112 N.C.A. § 4.104(1).
120 N.CA. § 4.104, 2.202, Comment 1.
121 N.C.A. § 4.204; U.C.C.C. 1 4.112.
122 N.CA. 0 4.204(3).
123 N.CA. 4 4.110.
124 See generally Felsenfeld, Some Ruminations About Remedies in Consumer-Credit
Transactions, 8 B.C. Ind. & Com. L. Rev. 535 (1967).
906
U.C.C.C. vs. N.C.A.
the N.C.A. answer this question in the affirmative and limit the
remedies traditionally used by the creditor.
The U.C.C.C. prohibits the creditor's use of a deficiency judgment
in an installment sale if the cash price of the transaction is $1000 or
less and the creditor has repossessed or accepted the collateral as a
result of the consumer's default.' 28 The U.C.C.C. also bans the use of
pre-judgment wage garnishment, 120 limits its use after judgment,'"
and declares that no employer may discharge an employee because he
has been subjected to garnishment.' 29 In addition, threats of physical
harm by a creditor to enforce an agreement render that agreement
void under the U.C.C.C. 129 Furthermore, if a court finds any agree-
ment or part of an agreement unconscionable as a matter of law, that
agreement or part thereof becomes unenforceable.'"
The N.C.A. is far more restrictive than the U.C.C.C. upon credi-
tors' use of remedies. To begin with, the consumer's default is very nar-
rowly defined under the N.C.A. This represents a change from the
existing laws where the parties to a transaction provide their own
definition of default in the agreement. The N.C.A. defines consumer
default as the non-payment by the consumer of : (1) three successive
installments; (2) any remaining balance within three months after the
due date of the final installment; or (3) an amount resulting from the
total of unpaid delinquent installments constituting 30 percent of the
amount financed.m. No cause of action shall accrue to the creditor
except upon a consumer default. 182
When a proper cause of action does accrue, the N.C.A. prescribes
the manner in which the creditor may assert his rights. Attachment of
the consumer's property before judgment is prohibited,'" as is wage
125 U.C.C.C. § 5.103.
126 U.C.C.C. 4 5.104; See also Prejudgment Wage Garnishment: Notice and Hearing
Requirements Under Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp., 11 B.C. Ind. & Corn. L. Rev. 462
(1970).
127 U.C.C.C. § 5.105.
(2) The maximum part of aggregate disposable earnings of an individual for
a work week which is subjected to garnishment to enforce payment of a judg-
ment arising from a consumer credit sale, consumer lease, or loan may not exceed
the lesser of
(a) 25 percent of his disposable earnings for that week, or
(b) the amount by which his disposable earnings for that week exceed forty
times the Federal minimum hourly wage prescribed by Section 6(a) (1) of the
Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, U.S.C. tit. 29, 206(a) (1) in effect at the time
the earnings are payable.
(c) In the case of earnings for a pay period other than a week, the Adminis-
trator shall prescribe by rule a multiple of the Federal minimum hourly wage
equivalent in effect to that set forth in paragraph (b).
128 U.C.C.C. 5.106.
120 U.C.C.C. § 5.107.
180 U.C.C.C. § 5.106.
151 N.C.A. 4 5.103(1).
122 N.C.A. § 5.103(2).
155 N.C.A. § 5.105.
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garnishment in any form.'" Satisfaction of judgment through attach-
ment is permitted, but sale of the consumer's household furnishings,
residence or other necessaries is forbidden.'" The N.C.A. follows the
U.C.C.C. in making unconscionable agreements unenforceable, but in
so doing it makes unconscionability a matter of fact rather than law,
and spells out the determining criteria.'" Extortionate enforcement of
agreements render them void under the N.C.A., and severe civil
penalties are levied upon those who engage in such practices.'"
The N.C.A. continues by restricting the creditors' enforcement of
security interests. Upon default the creditor may either waive his
security interest and seek a judgment, or proceed against the security
interest.' 88
 Although non-judicial enforcement of security interests is
1" N.C.A. § 5.106, Comment 1.
1" N.C.A. § 5.106.
133 N.C.A. § 5.107.
(3) Without limiting the scope of Subsection (I), the trier of fact shall be
entitled to consider, among other things, the following as pertinent to the issue of
unconscionability:
(a) The degree to which the practice unfairly takes advantage of the
lack of knowledge, ability, experience, or capacity of consumers;
(b) Knowledge by those engaging in the practice of the inability of con-
sumers to receive benefits properly anticipated from the goods or services
involved;
(c) Gross disparity between the price of goods or services and their
value as measured by the price at which similar goods or services are readily
obtainable by other consumers, or by other tests of true value;
(d) The fact that the practice may enable merchants to take advantage
of the inability of consumers reasonably to protect their interests by reason
of physical or mental infirmities, illiteracy or inability to understand the
language of the agreement, ignorance or lack of education or similar factors;
(e) The degree to which terms of the transaction require consumers to
waive legal rights;
(f) The degree to which terms of the transaction require consumers to
jeopardize money or property beyond the money or property immediately
at issue in the transaction;
(g) The degree to which the natural effect of the practice is to cause or
aid in causing consumers to misunderstand the true nature of the trans-
action or their rights and duties thereunder;
(h) The extent or degree to which the writing purporting to evidence
the obligation of the consumer in the transaction contains terms or provi-
sions or authorizes practices prohibited by law; and
(i) Definitions of unconscionability in statutes, regulations, rulings and
decisions of legislative, administrative or judicial bodies in this state or
elsewhere.
137 N.C.A. § 5.108(1) provides that aggrieved consumers may recover triple the
damages provided in 5.304 which provides:
A consumer may recover from the person violating this Act actual and punitive
damages, thirty percent of the transaction total, if applicable, or $300, which-
ever is greater . . . .
138 N.C.A. § 5.203(2).
133 N.C.A. § 5.204; See also Non-Judicial Repossession—Reprisal in Need of Reform,
11 B.C. Ind. & Com. L. Rev. 435 (1970).
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forbidden,'" voluntary surrender of the collateral by the debtor con-
stitutes legitimate repossession 140
In order to proceed against a security interest the creditor must
issue a complaint to which is attached a copy of the agreement evidenc-
ing the consumer's obligation. He is then required to wait fifteen days
after service of process to proceed against the collateral."' The con-
sumer, during that time, may request a hearing on the issue of reposses-
sion or may cure his default.'" If the consumer chooses to cure his
default by paying his current obligation, the complaint against him
must be dismissed.'" If collateral is successfully taken by the creditor,
the consumer may redeem that collateral up to thirty days after service
of process. Redemption is accomplished by the consumer's payment
of his current obligation, together with the creditor's court costs and
a performance deposit of one-third of the total obligation but not
greater than three installments.'"
If the creditor obtains judgment for the security interests he is
not entitled to a deficiency judgment unless the unpaid balance was
$2000 or more at the time of the default.'" The deficiency will be
determined by the difference between the fair market value of the
collateral and the unpaid obligation.'" This position is stricter than
the U.C.C.C. which, as has been stated, allows a deficiency judgment
if the cash price of the transaction exceeds $1000.
The N.C.A., then, is far more restrictive on creditor's rights and
remedies than the U.C.C.C. Garnishment, while limited by the
U.C.C.C., is abolished by the N.C.A. The enforcement of security
interests is a detailed process under the N.C.A., while it receives little
mention by the U.C.C.C. Non-judicial repossession is still available to
the creditor under the U.C.C.C., and the issues of a debtor curing his
default and redemption of collateral are untreated. Nevertheless, it
has been suggested that the N.C.A. approach is not necessarily more
beneficial to the consumer. It has been argued that too many restric-
tions on creditors' rights could very possibly lead to an unconscionable
reduction in the availability of consumer credit.'" Of particular con-
cern has been the elimination of wage garnishment, possibly the sin-
gularly most important collection device available to creditors." 8
It is submitted that these prohibitions of the N.C.A., together with
the provisions on deficiency judgments, would lead to a situation in
which the creditor would have high risks of non-collection upon con-
140 N.C.A. § 5.205.
141 N.C.A. § 5.206.
142 N.C.A. { 5.207(1).
143 N.C.A. § 5.207(3).
144 N.C.A. § 5.209.
148
 N.C.A. 1 3 . 211 ( 1 ).
143 N.C.A. § 5.212(1).
147 See W. Boyd, supra note 103.
148 Id.
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sumer default. While this might lead him to be more careful in examin-
ing a person's credit worthiness before extending credit, it might
also produce a condition in which the cost of these higher risks would
be passed off to the buyer in the form of increased prices.
As creditors' remedies have traditionally been detailed and so-
phisticated, so conversely have consumers' remedies been vague and
difficult to enforce.'" In response, the U.C.C.C. and N.C.A. have
drafted sections which attempt to deal with this problem. The U.C.C.C.
is, again, less expansive than the N.C.A. in this regard.
The U.C.C.C. provides that in the event of the violation of
certain of its provisions, such as those concerning negotiable instru-
ments, the consumer will be free from liability for the service or finance
charge, and may recover a penalty up to three times the amount of
such charge.' 5° Furthermore, the debtor is not liable for any amount
charged in excess of the maximum rates."' Also, when a financial
institution makes a loan which exceeds 18 percent, and is unauthorized
to do so according to the U.C.C.C. licensing provisions,'" the loan is
void and the debtor is not obligated to pay either the principal or the
finance charge.'" Finally, for violation of disclosure requirements, a
civil penalty and reasonable attorney's fees may be recovered.'"
The U.C.C.C. approach to consumer remedies has been criticized
because it does not provide incentive for the individual to bring actions
against unlawful creditors.'" There is limited recovery of attorney's
fees and no specific right of class action provided for."" Both of these
would provide encouragement to the consumer that a suit against an
unscrupulous creditor might be worthwhile.
Under the N.C.A. "any charge, practice, term, clause, provision,
security interest or other action or conduct" in violation of the N.C.A.
makes the transaction in question unenforceable.'" An aggrieved con-
sumer may also recover up to 30 percent of the total transaction
amount as damages for violation of certain of the N.C.A.'s provi-
sions.'" Consumers may also recover attorney's fees159 and institute
class actions.'°° In addition, when the creditor engages in transactions
which are void under the N.C.A., the consumer is allowed to retain
any goods purchased without further obligation."' The concept that
149 See Felsenfeld, supra note 124, at 537.
150 U.C.C.C. I 5.202(1).
151 U.C.C.C.	 5.202(3).
152 I./.C.C.C. 4 3.502.
158 U.C.C.C. 5 5.202(2).
154 U.C.C.C. 5 5.203. The civil penalty is twice the amount of the charge, but not
less than $100 nor more than $1000.
155 See W. Boyd, supra note 103.
150 Id.
157 N.CA. 5 5.305. See, e.g., N.C.A. 5.108 which pertains to extortionate practices.
158 N.CA. 5 5.304.
158 N.C.A. 5 5.307.
leo N.C.A. i 5.308.
181 N.C.A. 4 5.305.
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the consumer may, in certain situations, retain the goods in addition to
any other available remedies is perhaps the N.C.A.'s most radical
departure from existing law. Under ordinary contract law, when a
breach of contract occurs, one normally sues for expectancy or rescis-
sion. The attempt is to put the party in as good of a position as he
would have been if the contract had been fulfilled, or, alternatively, to
return him to the status quo. Under the N.C.A.'s provision permitting
retention of the goods without obligation for a violation of the Act,
the buyer not only may rescind the contract but, in addition, may
receive his expectancy. This penalty would appear to be the most
severe one imposed by the N.C.A.
It is contended that in reacting to what they considered inade-
quate consumer remedies under the U.C.C.C., the draftsmen of the
N.C.A. went too far. The multiplicity of types of consumer recovery
and, conversely, the limitation of creditor enforcement of debtor obliga-
tions, tend to swing the pendulum of protection too far toward the
consumers. Again, the result might be the abandonment of small loans
by legitimate financial institutions, or at least an increase in the price
of consumer goods due to the higher credit risks. It is recommended
that the N.C.A.'s section which allows the retention of the goods in
addition to all other available consumer remedies be eliminated. This,
it is felt, would not destroy the effectiveness of the proposed Act, and
would make it more palatable to state legislatures considering its
enactment.
D. Administration
Articles 6 of both the U.C.C.C. and N.C.A. provide for the
appointment of an Administrator to enforce the provisions of each
Act. This official's function under each proposed Act includes the
conducting of investigations,'" the issuing of injunctions against viola-
tions of the Act or unconscionable practices,'" and the procedural
authority to administer the Act.'" The N.C.A. Administrator, in addi-
tion, has the power to initiate class actions on behalf of consumers.'"
Finally, both the U.C.C.C. and N.C.A. provide for the establishment of
a Council on Consumer Affairs to be appointed by the governor for
the purpose of serving as an advisory board to the Administrator.'"
III. NEW AREAS COVERED BY THE N.C.A.
Since the U.C.C.C. is primarily legislation on consumer credit, it
leaves many areas affecting the consumer untreated. The N.C.A., in
response to this deficiency, attempts to span the full range of consumer
protection. The most notable areas which are treated solely by the
162
 N.C.A. § 6.106; U.C.C.C. § 6.104.
103
 N.C.A. H 6.108, 6.110; U.C.C.C. § 6.111.
In N.C.A. § 6.104; U.C.C.C. { 6.104.
N.C.A. 6.111.
106 N.C.A. § 6.301; U.C.C.C. § 6.301,
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N.C.A. are consumer credit cards, deceptive sales practices, debt
collection and credit-reporting agencies.
A. Credit Card Restrictions
The vastly expanded use of credit cards has led to many legal and
social problems. 1 tl 7
 In the past decade, consumers have been inundated
by unsolicited credit cards through the use of the mail. Often, there
has been little or no investigation into the credit responsibility of the
would-be users. The result is that frequently there is injudicious use
of the unrequested cards giving rise to large credit obligations that
otherwise would not have been incurred. Another serious problem is
assessing liability for the unauthorized use of credit cards. Many con-
sumers who have failed to notify the issuer of a lost credit card have
found themselves liable for large amounts charged by unknown per-
sons. Since this area so profoundly affects consumers, the draftsmen
of the N.C.A. felt that the rights and liabilities of the parties to credit
card transactions should be defined.
In keeping with its consumer-oriented approach, the N.C.A. min-
imizes the cardholder's liability. Credit cards, to be "accepted" under
the N.C.A., must be requested in writing by the consumer.'" The
effect of this provision is to prohibit unsolicited credit cards. In addi-
tion, a credit card holder is liable for the unauthorized use of his card
only if (1) he accepted the card, (2) he was given notice of his
potential liability, (3) the issuer had a procedure of notification upon
loss, and (4) the card had a means of identifying the owner.'" In any
event, the liability of a consumer for the unauthorized use of his credit
card is limited to fifty dollars.'" The effect of these N.C.A. provisions
is to shift the bulk of the loss due to the unauthorized use of credit
cards from the consumer to the issuer.
It is submitted that these provisions represent an improvement.
The card issuers are usually large-scale operations and are in a better
position to bear the financial losses incurred from such wrongful use.
However, there also arises a possibility of collusion by cardholders and
third parties to defraud the issuers through the falsely-claimed loss of
credit cards.
B. Limitations on Deceptive Sales Practices
The thrust of Article 3 of the N.C.A. is the prohibition of eigh-
teen specific trade practices employed by merchants, which the
drafters considered unfair and deceptive.'" These range from outlaw-
167 See generally I3ergsten, Credit Cards—A Prelude to the Cashless Society, B B.C.
Ind. & Conn. L. Rev. 485 (1967).
168 N.C.A. § 2.601(3).
166 N.C.A. § 2.603(1).
170 Id.
171 N.C.A. § 3.201 states:
(1) The following unfair methods of competition and unfair or deceptive
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ing the disparaging of the business of another, to the banning of false
and misleading statements concerning the reasons a merchant is reduc-
ing his prices.'" The effect of these provisions is to spell out what
practices of sellers are unfair and deceptive and, therefore, what would
constitute actionable violations of the N.C.A. No longer can sellers
defend these tactics on the ground that they are "clever advertising"
or that "everyone does them." Under the N.C.A., sellers would be
acts or practices undertaken by a merchant are hereby declared to be unlawful
and prohibited:
(a) Passing off goods or services as those of another;
(b) Causing likelihood of confusion or of misunderstanding as to the
source, sponsorship, approval or certification of goods or services;
(c) Causing likelihood of confusion or of misunderstanding as to affilia-
tion, connection or association with, or certification by, another;
(d) Using deceptive representations or designations of geographic origin
in connection with goods or services;
(e) Representing that goods or services have sponsorship, approval,
characteristics, ingredients, uses, benefits, or quantities that they do not
have or that a person has a sponsorship, approval, status, affiliation, or
connection that he does not have;
(f) Representing that goods are original or new if they are deteriorated,
altered, reconditioned, reclaimed, used or secondhand;
(g) Representing that goods or services arc of a particular standard,
quality, or grade or that goods are of a particular style or model, if they
are of another;
(h) Disparaging the goods, services, or business of another by false or
misleading representation of fact;
(I) Advertising goods or services with intent not to sell them as
advertised;
(j) Advertising goods or services with intent not to supply reasonably
expectable public demand unless the advertisement disclosed a limitation of
quantity;
(k) Making false or misleading statements of fact concerning reasons
for, existence of or amounts of price reductions;
(I) Representing that the consumer transaction confers or involves
rights, remedies or obligations that it does not have or involve or which are
prohibited by law;
(m) Representing that a part, replacement or repair service is needed
when it is not;
(n) Representing that the subject of a consumer transaction has been
supplied in accordance with a previous representation when it has not;
(o) Representing that the consumer will receive a rebate discount or
other economic benefit as an inducement for entering into a consumer trans-
action if the earning of the benefit is contingent on an event to occur sub-
sequent to the consummation of the transaction.
(p) Causing likelihood of confusion or of misunderstanding with respect
to the authority of a salesman, representative or agent to negotiate the final
terms of a transaction with a consumer;
(q) Engaging in any other conduct which similarly creates a likelihood
of confusion or of misunderstanding; or
(r) Engaging in any act or practice which is unfair or deceptive to the
consumer.
172 N.C.A. E 3.201. For an interesting discussion of the unfair and deceptive practices
employed by unscrupulous merchants see A. Mowbray, The Thumb on the Scale or The
Supermarket Shell Game (1967).
913
BOSTON COLLEGE INDUSTRIAL' AND COMMERCIAL LAW REVIEW
fully aware of what type of activity would be considered deceptive,
and consumers would be able to recover punitive damages of 30 percent
of the transaction total or $300 for the employment by sellers of such
practices.'"
Article 3 of the N.C.A. also provides that a seller of goods
may not limit or exclude warranties implied by law such as one of
merchantability or fitness for a particular purpose.' 74 Also a seller
may not disclaim the warranties provided for by the Uniform Com-
mercial Code.'" This is contrary to the "unless otherwise agreed"
freedom of contract approach of the Uniform Commercial Code. 17°
C. Debt Collection
The N.C.A. devotes Article 7 to debt collection. The draf t-
ing of this section stems from the devious methods employed by some
creditors to put pressure upon delinquent debtors. Under this article
the following practices are prohibited in the process of debt collection:
(1) conduct constituting the illegal practice of law, such as the use of
an attorney's name or stationery; "T (2) threats or coercion as to
physical violence or destruction of credit; 178 (3) harrassment and
abuse, such as the use of profane language or the repeated use of
anonymous phone calls; " 9 (4) unreasonable publication of facts about
the consumer to his employer, family or to the general public; 180 (5)
misrepresentation or fraud in the collection of a debt; 181 and (6) any
other unconscionable means employed to assert a claim against the
debtor.'82 The consumer who has been wronged by the creditor through
methods prohibited under Article 7 of the N.C.A. can cancel the
underlying obligation and be awarded compensatory as well as punitive
damages.'"
It is felt that this section also represents a considerable advance
in consumer protection. The specific civil remedies available to an
aggrieved consumer provide incentive for instituting actions against
unscrupulous collectors. Moreover, the possibility of such severe lia-
bility might very well act as a deterrent against the implementation
of such practices.
D. Credit-Reporting Agencies
The problems arising from the dissemination of information by
credit-reporting agencies are particularly acute in regard to the con-
178 N.C.A. §§ 3.203, 5.304.
174 N.C.A. § 3.302.
175 U.C.C. H 2-313, 2-314, 2-315; N.CA. H 3.301, 3.302.
178 U.C.C. H 1-102(3), 2-314.
177 N.C.A. § 7.201.
178 N.CA.	 7.202.
170 N.C.A. § 7.203.
180 N.C.A. § 7.204.
181 N.C.A. § 7.205.
182 N.CA. I 7.206.




 The consumer applying for credit generally has no knowledge
of the sources of information the creditor has relied upon in deciding
whether or not to extend credit. Usually the consumer has no oppor-
tunity to question the accuracy of such information, while at the same
time this information is easily accessible to potential creditors.'"
Article 8 of the N.C.A. covers this area, and defines consumer-
reporting agencies as those which report data concerning consumers
for the purpose of establishing the consumer's eligibility for credit,
insurance or employment.'" Under the N.C.A., the consumer must be
informed of and consent to reports which are made about him, and any
person denying credit to a consumer must notify him as to the reason
and details, if the information causing this denial was obtained from a
credit-reporting agency.'" The consumer may also have access to the
files on him kept by a reporting agency, for the purpose of examination
and correction whenever necessary. 188
If any reporting agency or user of information gathered or dis-
seminated by such an agency violates the N.C.A. requirements, the
consumer may recover actual damages incurred and attorney's fees.'"
In addition, if the consumer's reputation has been injured through the
negligent reporting of false information, an action for defamation may
be brought. 19°
CONCLUSION
State legislation in the area of consumer protection has been
gradual and incomplete. Hence, there is need for reform through uni-
form or model legislation. While the U.C.C.C. and the N.C.A. attempt
to fulfill this desire, neither, as presently constituted, is satisfactory.
Although the U.C.C.C. contains many admirable provisions, such as
that on home solicitation sales, it is inadequate in regard to consumers'
remedies and contains loopholes by which creditors can circumvent its
provisions. The N.C.A. provides a far more comprehensive treatment
of consumer problems. However, its main flaw is its own overzealous-
ness. In attempting to fortify the consumer against unscrupulous credi-
tors, it has put too many restrictions on the legitimate lender. The
result of such limitations might well be the discontinuance of consumer
loans by such institutions. Therefore, the consumer would be left with-
out the readily available sources of credit he now enjoys. It is sub-
mitted that through the elimination or revision of those sections of the
N.C.A. which unduly restrict creditors, the N.C.A. could become a
184 See generally Credit Investigations and the Right to Privacy: Quest for Remedy,
57 Geo. L. J. 509 (1969).
188 Id. at 512.
188 N.C.A. { 8.103.
187 N.CA. { 8.201.
188 N.C.A. §§ 8.202, 8.203.
189 N.CA. § 8.301.
199 N.CA. § 8.303.
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thorough and balanced piece of legislation. As such it would be suitable
for enactment by any state government and a long awaited consumer
reform.
TERRANCE P. CHRISTENSON
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